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12 Feb 54

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

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SUBJECT: Status of Planning and Preparation for CIA's Clandestine
Services Wartime Operations and Activities

1. On 15 July 1952, the Deputy Director (Plans) was delegated the Director's authority for the planning, execution, and review of the missions entrusted to the Director under NSCID-5, NSC 10/2, and NSC 10/5. Within the terms of those documents, one large segment of the responsibility thus accruing to the Deputy Director (Plans) was that of generating the necessary plans and preparations for the transition to, and conduct of, this Agency's wartime mission. The Deputy Director (Plans) has, in turn, made the Chief [REDACTED] his executive in these matters, with responsibility for monitoring and coordinating the hot war PM, PP, and FI planning process as a whole [REDACTED] and DCI memorandum of 15 July 1952). I believe that a brief resume or progress report concerning this entire subject for your information is warranted at this time.

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2. ASSUMPTIONS GOVERNING WAR PLANNING:

- a. The possibility of a global war at any time cannot be entirely discounted.
- b. The tense international situation will continue for the foreseeable future, and
- c. The mission of CIA as outlined in NSCID-5, NSC 10/2, and NSC 10/5 and other pertinent documents will not be materially changed in the event of a global war.

3. CIA's PRIMARY WARTIME RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. "The National Security Act of 1947" charged CIA with certain responsibilities concerning the future security of the United States. The National Security Act further empowered the CIA to perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally, and to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.

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National
Security Act
1947
Responsibility

**NSCID-5
Responsibilities**

b. On 12 December 1947 the NSC directed the DCI to conduct all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the U.S. and its possessions except for certain agreed intelligence activities by other departments and agencies. NSCID-5 further stipulated that, in time of war or when the President directs, the DCI will coordinate espionage and counter-espionage operations in or from a theater of active military operations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war, where American forces are engaged, representatives of the DCI conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations in or from the theater shall be under the direct command of the United States Theater Commander.

**NSC 10/2
Responsibilities**

c. On 18 June 1948 the NSC charged the DCI with responsibility for planning and conducting covert operations, and in coordination with the JCS to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime. NSC 10/2 further specified that, in time of war or when the President directs, in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American theater commander.

**NSC 10/5
Responsibilities**

d. The NSC published NSC 10/5 on 23 October 1951. This document, in addition to establishing policy for cold war covert operations, charged the Agency with responsibility for ensuring the availability of covert forces in the event of war for utilization in accordance with principles established by the NSC, including wherever practicable provisions upon which the military may expand these forces on a military basis in time of war within active theaters of operations.

e. Other pertinent NSC, PSB and OCB documents prescribing policy dealing with particular areas and/or functions in cold war operations, imply wartime planning responsibilities for CIA to the extent that these cold war operations may be carried over into hot war operations.

4. Major CIA-DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

**CIA/Defense
Relationship**

a. Establishment of CIA-Defense Department Relationship: Efforts to define CIA's military support mission, clearly and precisely enough to provide a realistic working basis within which the first planning steps could be taken, and action to establish the machinery with which that mission could be implemented and regulated, has brought about a series of flexible agreements between this Agency and the Department of Defense (D/D). Coordinated war planning in the unconventional warfare field between the JCS and the CIA is an established fact and three basic documents have emerged as

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Command
Relationships
Paper

(1) The Command Relationships Paper (JCS 1969/26) is the basic DCI-JCS agreement establishing command and control relationships between CIA and commanders under the JCS in the unconventional warfare field. It does not include FI activities. JCS 1969/26 establishes CIA as a component force coequal to the three military components ("Fourth Force concept") in active theaters of war. It stipulates that:

(a) CIA will retain its organizational integrity insofar as practicable - including responsibility for technical and administrative matters, with exercise of the latter controlled by CIA in a manner corresponding to that exercised by the three military services over their component forces assigned to the field.

(b) Consistent with his strategic and operational responsibilities and his overall authority, the commander of a command established by the JCS will exercise authority over the CIA component force corresponding to that exercised over the Army, Navy and Air Force component forces assigned to his command.

(c) A CIA force commander, designated by the DCI and acceptable to the area (theater) commander, is charged with the hot war responsibility of making recommendations to the commander on the proper employment of the CIA component and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned him by the commander - whether the mission is to be performed independently by the CIA component or in a Joint UW Task Force with any or all of the services.

(d) The DCI will retain operational control of "exceptional operations" conducted within, from or into an area (theater) of war.

Though JCS 1969/26 establishes a basis upon which unconventional warfare planning can proceed, and in this sense it represents a very important action accomplished, it also indicates a very significant CIA wartime responsibility in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged - that of a component force and a proportionate contribution to the war effort from the outbreak of war.

JCS-CIA
Evasion and
Escape Agreement

(2) JCS 1969/26, issued 27 October 1952, delineates the responsibilities in the field of evasion and escape (E&E) as between CIA and the military services. By this document CIA agrees to undertake the following, where security permits, subject to the capabilities of the Agency at the time the military requirements are placed:

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(b) In wartime: the operation of such mechanisms, the expansion of existing P&E facilities and/or the establishment of new facilities, as the theater commander may direct.

(3) The third basic document is the Unconventional Warfare Annex to the JCS Joint Outline Emergency War Plan (JOEWP), or its successor. This document gives broad unconventional warfare guidance for global planning and provides strategic concept and basis for those UW operations conducted by CIA in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged. It outlines the proposed basic undertakings of the post D-Day UW effort, listing general as well as specific global tasks, and assumes

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Unconventional
Warfare Annex to
Joint Outline Emer-
gency War Plan

War Planning
System

b. Establishment of the CIA War Planning System: As an initial step in the preparation of the Agency for its wartime planning responsibilities and to extend Headquarters planning to the field, a modest CIA war planning system was established for the purpose of advising and assisting the JCS field commanders in the preparation of their unconventional warfare plans and for the preparation of CIA war plans. This system provides for senior war planners and war plans groups in Europe, the Near East, and the Far East (21 persons). It also provides for the attachment of CIA planners to the staffs of the various JCS commanders. The three senior war planners have been selected and are functioning and all the other positions except for the War Plans Group Near East are either filled, partially filled, or being provided for through liaison visits. Through this arrangement planning for wartime unconventional warfare activities in support of the military has progressed to about mid-way through the first full planning cycle, specific military UW requirements are being received by this Agency. Certain portions of these requirements are being given tentative acceptance by the senior war planner in the field on the basis of existing covert assets. It is envisaged that the unaccepted balance, which is approved by the JCS and the DCI, will become the subjects of contingent planning, programming and transition build-up.

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(1) The CINCPAC UW Annex has been received by the JCS and by CIA. A preliminary analysis of this plan indicated that it is a realistic and feasible plan; however it is indicated that the military requirements therein will require an augmented CIA effort in the CINCPAC area if the UW Annex is approved by the JCS and the DCI. A study has been prepared for the attention of the Director, making certain recommendations for preparatory action by CIA, anticipating JCS approval of this annex.

(2) A draft of the CINCEUR UW Annex has been received. Here too an augmented CIA effort is indicated.

(3) A draft of the CINCPCE UW Annex has been received and is under review by the PM Staff.

(4) The CINCELM UW Annex for the Near and Middle East areas is in the formative stage. In anticipation of new efforts to establish a defense mechanism in these areas, [REDACTED] has been appointed our Senior War Planner Near East (in addition to his other duties) with headquarters in [REDACTED]

c. Establishment of Required Multinational Planning Mechanism:

(1) With the advent of SHAPE and at the request of SACEUR a multinational clandestine planning committee (CPC) has been established for the purpose of planning the multinational clandestine organization for the support of SHAPE in war, and for the coordination of SHAPE's clandestine requirements. CIA's representation on the Clandestine Planning Committee takes its guidance and instruction from the Senior War Planner Europe (SWPE). In general, the CPC is expected to be replaced in wartime by an "Allied Clandestine Coordinating Group" for coordination of the efforts of the National Clandestine Services in support of SHAPE's military operations. The only operational control this Allied Clandestine Coordinating Group will have over the National Clandestine resources of each NATO member is that permitted by the existing policies of the nation concerned. Some of SHAPE's wartime UW and intelligence target requirements are being considered by the appropriate clandestine services at the present time. Those SHAPE requirements being considered by CIA are also USCINCEUR's (EUCOM) Requirements, and SHAPE's priority on Retardation is an issue of

considerable concern to the Agency.

CIA Wartime
Organizational
Plans

(2) A Draft CIA World-Wide Wartime Organizational Plan has been prepared and is currently under consideration by the Senior Staff War Plans Coordinating Committee. Supplementary to this Headquarters World-Wide Plan, the SWPE and SWPFE are concurrently developing the wartime organization and related plans for Europe and the Far East. The SWPE plans are expected in Headquarters for consideration in March 1954, and the SWPFE plans should be in Headquarters by mid-year 1954.

CIA Global
War Plan

(3) The old "CIA/GPC Strategic Plan for Hot War" is being rewritten as the "CIA Global War Plan" by the PM Staff. This plan will in general terms provide guidance for world-wide clandestine operations, logistics, communications, air and maritime support, and other related matters. It will also include a detailed annex for deployment of Headquarters personnel to the CIA field echelon organizations. In terms of preparedness for the Agency's wartime mission, this important phase of war planning requires more Agency-wide coordination than heretofore.

Hot War
Country Plans

(4) Up-to-date hot war country plans, both organization and operation types, are being considered in the Headquarters [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] "Guide for CIA War Planning and Programming", but with a few exceptions, this planning has not been initiated as yet. These country plans, inasmuch as they are supplementary to the area (theater) organization and operation plans being developed by the senior war planners, should be written by the CIA field stations; however at present the field stations do not have the capability.

Commo
Planning

(5) Both planning and actual implementation in the communications field are in an advanced state. The Office of Communications, using the Korean operations as a criteria, has been able to determine the needs of a global communications system which, the Communications Office estimates, is capable of serving all Agency traffic that a global war would require. The Office of Communications states that this system is already in the field in large part. It consists of

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[REDACTED] has also arrived at estimates of its wartime mobilization personnel needs as well as plans for their training and redeployment. DD/P and the Office of Communications are currently resurveying the wartime communications requirements to determine changes that may be necessary.

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Planning**

(6) A "CIA Master Evacuation Plan for a General Emergency" has been prepared and is being coordinated. Dissemination of this plan to the to the senior war planners for their guidance is expected at an early date. This master plan covers operational concepts in the field of evacuation and defines the responsibilities of both the field and Headquarters for the preparation of appropriate plans. The CIA field planners must prepare, in collaboration with the military and State Department, both area and country-type CIA evacuation plans - this planning has been initiated.

War Projects

(7) Under the direction of the DE/P-PFC Staff, steps are being taken within the senior staffs and area divisions to review all cold war operations and assets in order to determine their most profitable and/or feasible utilization in hot war. Further, it is intended that all existing and future cold war projects will be supplemented by the preparation of "War Projects" for each area which will specify how all cold war assets are to be redeployed, utilized and controlled after the outbreak of war. Preparation of such "War Projects" will represent a big step forward in our war-readiness and transition.

**Negotiation
of Intelli-
gence Agreed
Activities**

(8) The Agency and the Defense Department have been negotiating for an agreement concerning [REDACTED] Defense components for some time. As far as can be determined the two parties concerned are still not near an agreed position. The lack of an agreement in this field is hindering cold and hot war planning for clandestine collection.

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Training

(9) The Office of Training has recently developed course outlines for a War Plans Staff Course. The need for such a course and subjects to be included have been studied in seminar by representatives from each interested office of the Agency. It was concluded that there is a definite need for such training. In time, as a result of this training, all elements of the Agency involved in war planning will more clearly understand CIA's war responsibilities and war planning and preparation requirements.

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**Overseas
Bases**

(10) Considerable progress has been made in the planning and preparation of [REDACTED] operations in hot war. The JCS has directed all the military services to cooperate fully with CIA in planning the details, requirements, coordination, cover and support of these bases. At the present time, the CINC's and CIA's overseas planners are preparing phased estimates of the indigenous Unconventional Warfare forces and the envisaged hot war tasks as a guide for logistics programming. A CIA Headquarters Clandestine Service Task Force on Logistical

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Base Planning has been appointed and is studying and coordinating base programming. Concurrently, work is being carried forward on completing

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to make them fully operational at the earliest possible date. Planning and programming for forward bases to supplement the major bases is in progress.

Need for Basic
Guidance for
FI War Planning

7. MAJOR WAR PLANNING DEFICIENCIES:

a. For FI war planning purposes the development of agreed CIA-Defense papers outlining the Command Relationships in FI activity, a point of contact for FI matters with the Secretary of Defense or the JCS, an agreed activities paper and an Intelligence Annex or other paper to the JOEMP which will provide strategic guidance in this field - all are very urgently needed. Due to the absence of agreed papers of this nature, realistic consideration of transition, formal war planning and firm preparation therefor in the espionage and counter-espionage fields have been handicapped.

FI and PP
Planners

b. CIA's world-wide war planning system lacks operational specialists in the PP and FI fields to participate in war planning. The field stations, on the other hand, have such operational specialists who, however, lack experience, background and training in war planning. Discussions to overcome this deficiency have been commenced with Chiefs, PP and FI.

Need for
Completion of
Organization
Plans

c. Completion and approval of the CIA Wartime Organization Plan, the CIA Wartime Organization for Europe, and the CIA Wartime Organization Far East and related plans with the least practical delay is basic requirement. These plans must be completed and approved before pre D-Day preparation can be consummated.

Need for War-
time Decen-
tralization

(1) In wartime great decentralization of command authority will be essential. Each CIA Area (theater) Commander will be responsible to both the Military Theater Commander and to the DCI. Definitive action to establish the wartime framework and to designate the positions or personalities which will occupy the key roles is essential.

Need for CIA
Commanders
Designate or
Theater Senior
Representatives

(2) The principle which requires a peacetime organization and operation that is quickly and easily converted to a war organization and operation is especially pertinent in view of the CIA wartime responsibility to the military. This is particularly true in Europe where the priority military task is retardation of the enemy advance. At this stage of the Agency's organizational and operational planning, it appears that the CIA Area (Theater) Organization must closely parallel

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the top echelons of the U.S. and/or allied (where existing) military organization. It would be highly desirable to nominate the CIA Commanders Designate at an early date. These commanders would be the senior war planners acting concurrently.

Need for
Headquarters and
Field Reorganiza-
tion for War

(3) The existing CIA organization in the field would have to be drastically adapted for conversion in case of war. This planning can and should be done prior to war. Some implementation of the wartime organization should be accomplished prior to outbreak of war.

(4) The organization of Headquarters CIA is likewise directly implicated. At present the Washington Office is in operational control of the entire CIA effort. Provision should be made for at least partial decentralization of this control to the field in areas likely to become theaters of war.

Readjustment
of Priorities
in CIA Clandes-
tine Activities

d. Completion of the first cycle of CIA-Defense UW and Intelligence Operational planning and JCS-DCI consideration and approval thereof will give the Agency its first real conception of the extent and comprehensiveness of our war mission. Decisions on readjustment of the priority of effort in the PM, PP and FI activities and programming for augmentation of assets will undoubtedly have to be made. This will be especially true in the case of the CINCEUR UW Plan where the SHAPE and EUCOM emphasis upon retardation has resulted in a great requirement for PM type activity to be performed by the Agency. To date the Agency has received from EUCOM requirements for [REDACTED] targets, and of 25X4 this number the SWPE has tentatively accepted [REDACTED] targets. This capability has been diminished subsequently by reverses in the field. SHAPE has recently requested the Clandestine Services to make their major contribution between [REDACTED]. A 25X4 positive CIA position concerning the CIA participation in the SHAPE and EUCOM Retardation Programs is needed so that military planning, CIA and particularly the DD/P Area Divisions will be guided accordingly.

e. The planning related to and in support of the CIA Wartime Organization Plans and the CIA-Defense UW and Intelligence Operations Plans has been initiated for the most part but of course is not complete. It is believed that this planning will be greatly simplified and expedited by the completion of the organization and operations planning. There is, however, need for accelerated action in concluding agreements with the Department of Defense for Air and Maritime Support of this Agency's activities, and the resultant planning must be accomplished and coordinated as well.

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f. There is also a need for consideration of training of personnel in adequate numbers for war. Training Plans should be developed and either implemented or held ready for implementation at the appropriate time.

g. With the development of the Army Special Forces there has arisen a need for a CIA-Defense agreed activities paper in the Guerrilla Warfare field as basic guidance to the military commanders and to the Agency for planning purposes. Based upon ESC 10/2 and 5 and the Command Relationships Paper, the FM Staff has prepared and is now coordinating a proposed CIA position paper on this subject for transmittal to the Secretary of Defense.

h. Perfection of the many plans required for the fulfillment of CIA's wartime responsibilities is necessarily a lengthy process. The broad plans involve difficult policy decisions which cause delay; and the more detailed area plans are dependant, not only on provisions of the broad plans, but also upon each other. But the danger of war cannot be entirely discounted, much of this planning has at least been initiated even though the broad plans are not complete. This has led to some difficulties, inevitably; however through close coordination, and the use of reasonable assumptions, progress is being made. And further, until the first full planning cycle has been completed, major and subordinate plans must continue to be drawn up concurrently.

8. IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS:

a. I have and will continue to urge all the appropriate elements of the Agency to increase and expedite their war planning and preparation efforts so that the deficiencies listed above may be overcome and that the Agency will attain an acceptable state of war-readiness in a reasonable period of time.

b. Reference paragraph 7a, the appropriate elements of the DD/P are currently negotiating the development of agreed CIA-Defense papers necessary for war planning in the Foreign Intelligence field.

c. The deficiency noted in paragraph 7b has been recognized by GFM, CPP and CFI. Though FI and FP specialists have not been placed in the world-wide planning system as yet, FI and FP war planning has been initiated and is being developed concurrently with the negotiation of the necessary agreed basis papers.

d. Reference paragraph 7c, completion of the wartime organization plans is recognized as of vital importance and is being pressed accordingly. When completed, recommendations for approval and necessary implementation will be forwarded. Designation of CIA Commanders Designate abroad will be recommended.

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e. Our efforts in headquarters and in the field to complete the hot war operational planning have been increased (deficiency noted in paragraph 7d). We will continue to press for the completion of the first full cycle of CIA-Defense UW and Intelligence Operational war planning. Based upon these plans, recommendations for the readjustment of the priority of CIA's efforts in the PM, PP and FI fields will be forwarded. If CIA cannot develop the capability to make a significant contribution to the SHAPE and HUCOM retardation programs, as currently appears to be the case, the military and possibly the NSC must be so advised.

9. CONCLUSION:

a. In general the progress in CIA war planning and the establishment of a CIA wartime organization, which was only begun realistically with the delineation of CIA/Defense responsibilities in February 1953, is reasonably satisfactory considering the nature of such planning.

b. The scope and ability of CIA to support the military in wartime has yet to be determined. The CINCPAC UW Annex is the only definite requirement to be received. It is general in nature and it has not as yet been approved by the JCS. CINCEUR (and SHAPE) requirements are being studied piecemeal by the area divisions concerned.

10. RECOMMENDATION:

a. It is recommended that the conclusions in paragraph 9 be noted and that the CPM, assisted by appropriate senior staff chiefs, present the status of war planning to the DCI, DECI and DD/P (with other interested persons present) as an informal briefing using charts to the maximum.

b. It is further recommended that the present status of determination of CIA support in wartime be also included in the briefing proposed in paragraph 10 above.

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